

2022 State of the Market Report for PJM

Informational MC
April 13, 2023

IMM



Monitoring Analytics

Market Monitoring Unit

- **Monitoring Analytics, LLC**
 - Independent company
 - Formed August 1, 2008
- **Independent Market Monitor for PJM**
 - Independent from Market Participants
 - Independent from RTO management
 - Independent from RTO board of managers
- **MMU Accountability**
 - To FERC (per FERC MMU Orders and MM Plan)
 - To PJM markets
 - To PJM Board for administration of the contract

Role of Market Monitoring

- **Market monitoring is required by FERC Orders**
- **Role of competition under FERC regulation**
 - **Mechanism to regulate prices**
 - **Competitive outcome = just and reasonable**
- **FERC has enforcement authority**
- **Relevant model of competition is not laissez faire**
- **Competitive outcomes are not automatic**

Role of Market Monitoring

- **Detailed rules required**
- **Detailed monitoring required:**
 - **Of participants**
 - **Of RTO**
 - **Of rules**
- **Market monitoring is primarily analytical**
 - **Adequacy of market rules**
 - **Compliance with market rules**
 - **Exercise of market power**
 - **Market manipulation**


Role of Market Monitoring

- **Market monitoring provides inputs to prospective mitigation**
- **Market monitoring provides retrospective mitigation**
- **Market monitoring provides information**
 - **To FERC**
 - **To state regulators**
 - **To market participants**
 - **To RTO**

Market Monitoring Plan

- **Monitor compliance with rules**
 - **Monitor the potential of market participants to exercise market power**
 - **Monitor for market manipulation**
- **Recommend changes to rules**
 - **Monitor actual or potential design flaws in rules**
 - **Monitor structural problems in the PJM market**
- **Report on market issues**
 - **State of the market reports**
 - **Other reports**


PJM



Legend

| | |
|--|--|
| Allegheny Power Company (APS) | Duquesne Light (DUQ) |
| American Electric Power Co., Inc (AEP) | Eastern Kentucky Power Cooperative (EKPC) |
| American Transmission Systems, Inc. (ATSI) | Jersey Central Power and Light Company (JCPLC) |
| Atlantic Electric Company (ACEC) | Metropolitan Edison Company (MEC) |
| Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BGE) | Ohio Valley Electric Corporation (OVEC) |
| ComEd (COMED) | PECO Energy (PECO) |
| Dayton Power and Light Company (DAY) | Pennsylvania Electric Company (PE) |
| Delmarva Power and Light (DPL) | Pepco (PEPCO) |
| Dominion (DOM) | PPL Electric Utilities (PPL) |
| Duke Energy Ohio/Kentucky (DUKE) | Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSEG) |
| | Rockland Electric Company (REC) |

Total price of wholesale power




PJM summary statistics

| | 2021 | 2022 | Percent Change |
|--|---------|-----------|----------------|
| Average Hourly Load Plus Exports (MWh) | 92,774 | 94,301 | 1.6% |
| Average Hourly Generation Plus Imports (MWh) | 94,501 | 96,147 | 1.7% |
| Peak Load Plus Export (MWh) | 151,680 | 149,531 | (1.4%) |
| Installed Capacity at December 31 (MW) | 186,593 | 183,385 | (1.7%) |
| Load Weighted Average Real Time LMP (\$/MWh) | \$39.78 | \$80.14 | 101.4% |
| Total Congestion Costs (\$ Million) | \$995.3 | \$2,501.3 | 151.3% |
| Total Uplift Credits (\$ Million) | \$178.4 | \$289.9 | 62.5% |
| Total PJM Billing (\$ Billion) | \$54.13 | \$86.22 | 59.3% |

The energy market results were competitive

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Market Structure: Aggregate Market | Partially Competitive | |
| Market Structure: Local Market | Not Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Competitive | |
| Market Performance | Competitive | Effective |


RT monthly and yearly load-weighted average LMP



Real-time load-weighted average LMP

| | Real-Time Load-Weighted Average LMP | | | Year to Year Change | | | |
|------|-------------------------------------|---------|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------|---------|--------------------|
| | Average | Median | Standard Deviation | Average | Average Percent | Median | Standard Deviation |
| 1998 | \$24.16 | \$17.60 | \$39.29 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 1999 | \$34.07 | \$19.02 | \$91.49 | \$9.91 | 41.0% | 8.1% | 132.8% |
| 2000 | \$30.72 | \$20.51 | \$28.38 | (\$3.34) | (9.8%) | 7.9% | (69.0%) |
| 2001 | \$36.65 | \$25.08 | \$57.26 | \$5.93 | 19.3% | 22.3% | 101.8% |
| 2002 | \$31.60 | \$23.40 | \$26.75 | (\$5.06) | (13.8%) | (6.7%) | (53.3%) |
| 2003 | \$41.23 | \$34.96 | \$25.40 | \$9.64 | 30.5% | 49.4% | (5.0%) |
| 2004 | \$44.34 | \$40.16 | \$21.25 | \$3.10 | 7.5% | 14.9% | (16.3%) |
| 2005 | \$63.46 | \$52.93 | \$38.10 | \$19.12 | 43.1% | 31.8% | 79.3% |
| 2006 | \$53.35 | \$44.40 | \$37.81 | (\$10.11) | (15.9%) | (16.1%) | (0.7%) |
| 2007 | \$61.66 | \$54.66 | \$36.94 | \$8.31 | 15.6% | 23.1% | (2.3%) |
| 2008 | \$71.13 | \$59.54 | \$40.97 | \$9.47 | 15.4% | 8.9% | 10.9% |
| 2009 | \$39.05 | \$34.23 | \$18.21 | (\$32.09) | (45.1%) | (42.5%) | (55.6%) |
| 2010 | \$48.35 | \$39.13 | \$28.90 | \$9.30 | 23.8% | 14.3% | 58.7% |
| 2011 | \$45.94 | \$36.54 | \$33.47 | (\$2.41) | (5.0%) | (6.6%) | 15.8% |
| 2012 | \$35.23 | \$30.43 | \$23.66 | (\$10.71) | (23.3%) | (16.7%) | (29.3%) |
| 2013 | \$38.66 | \$33.25 | \$23.78 | \$3.43 | 9.7% | 9.3% | 0.5% |
| 2014 | \$53.14 | \$36.20 | \$76.20 | \$14.47 | 37.4% | 8.9% | 220.4% |
| 2015 | \$36.16 | \$27.66 | \$31.06 | (\$16.98) | (31.9%) | (23.6%) | (59.2%) |
| 2016 | \$29.23 | \$25.01 | \$16.12 | (\$6.93) | (19.2%) | (9.6%) | (48.1%) |
| 2017 | \$30.99 | \$26.35 | \$19.32 | \$1.76 | 6.0% | 5.4% | 19.9% |
| 2018 | \$38.24 | \$29.55 | \$32.89 | \$7.25 | 23.4% | 12.1% | 70.2% |
| 2019 | \$27.32 | \$23.63 | \$23.12 | (\$10.92) | (28.6%) | (20.0%) | (29.7%) |
| 2020 | \$21.77 | \$19.07 | \$12.50 | (\$5.55) | (20.3%) | (19.3%) | (45.9%) |
| 2021 | \$39.78 | \$32.11 | \$27.72 | \$18.02 | 82.8% | 68.4% | 121.8% |
| 2022 | \$80.14 | \$60.09 | \$135.55 | \$40.36 | 101.4% | 87.2% | 389.1% |

RT load-weighted average LMP



Components of RT load-weighted average LMP

| Element | 2021 | | 2022 | | Change in |
|--|---------------------|---------|---------------------|---------|-----------|
| | Contribution to LMP | Percent | Contribution to LMP | Percent | Percent |
| Gas | \$21.43 | 53.9% | \$41.42 | 51.7% | (2.2%) |
| Positive Markup | \$3.68 | 9.2% | \$7.29 | 9.1% | (0.2%) |
| Coal | \$4.11 | 10.3% | \$5.66 | 7.1% | (3.3%) |
| Scarcity | \$0.22 | 0.6% | \$5.05 | 6.3% | 5.7% |
| Ten Percent Adder | \$2.54 | 6.4% | \$4.70 | 5.9% | (0.5%) |
| Transmission Constraint Penalty Factor | \$3.31 | 8.3% | \$4.63 | 5.8% | (2.6%) |
| Market-to-Market | \$0.41 | 1.0% | \$2.48 | 3.1% | 2.1% |
| Variable Maintenance | \$1.36 | 3.4% | \$2.40 | 3.0% | (0.4%) |
| NO _x Cost | \$0.19 | 0.5% | \$2.17 | 2.7% | 2.2% |
| Emergency Demand Response | \$0.00 | 0.0% | \$1.75 | 2.2% | 2.2% |
| CO ₂ Cost | \$1.08 | 2.7% | \$1.74 | 2.2% | (0.5%) |
| Opportunity Cost Adder | \$0.16 | 0.4% | \$1.58 | 2.0% | 1.6% |
| Ancillary Service Redispatch Cost | \$0.35 | 0.9% | \$1.45 | 1.8% | 0.9% |
| Oil | \$0.25 | 0.6% | \$1.42 | 1.8% | 1.2% |
| Variable Operations | \$0.84 | 2.1% | \$0.94 | 1.2% | (0.9%) |
| LPA Rounding Difference | \$0.18 | 0.5% | \$0.64 | 0.8% | 0.3% |
| Increase Generation Differential | \$0.13 | 0.3% | \$0.35 | 0.4% | 0.1% |
| NA | \$1.51 | 3.8% | \$0.25 | 0.3% | (3.5%) |
| Other | \$0.01 | 0.0% | \$0.02 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Landfill Gas | \$0.00 | 0.0% | \$0.02 | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| SO ₂ Cost | \$0.00 | 0.0% | \$0.00 | 0.0% | (0.0%) |
| LPA-SCED Differential | \$0.07 | 0.2% | (\$0.03) | (0.0%) | (0.2%) |
| Decrease Generation Differential | (\$0.03) | (0.1%) | (\$0.04) | (0.1%) | 0.0% |
| Renewable Energy Credits | (\$0.03) | (0.1%) | (\$0.39) | (0.5%) | (0.4%) |
| PJM Administrative Cap | \$0.00 | 0.0% | (\$1.39) | (1.7%) | (1.7%) |
| Negative Markup | (\$1.99) | (5.0%) | (\$3.96) | (4.9%) | 0.1% |
| Total | \$39.78 | 100.0% | \$80.14 | 100.0% | 0.0% |

Energy market price increase

- **The real-time load-weighted average LMP in 2022 increased 101.4 percent from the first nine months of 2021, from \$39.78 per MWh to \$80.14 per MWh.**
- **This is the highest average PJM price (\$80.14 per MWh), the highest price increase (\$40.36 per MWh) and the highest percent price increase (101.4 percent) for a year since the creation of PJM markets in 1999.**

Components of Increase in real-time load-weighted average LMP: 2022

| Component | 2021 | 2022 | Increase in LMP | Percent |
|--|----------------|----------------|-----------------|---------------|
| Fuel and Consumables | \$26.62 | \$49.45 | \$22.82 | 56.6% |
| Emission Related | \$1.40 | \$5.11 | \$3.71 | 9.2% |
| Market Power Related | \$5.59 | \$10.42 | \$4.83 | 12.0% |
| Scarcity | \$0.22 | \$5.05 | \$4.83 | 12.0% |
| Transmission Constraint Penalty Factor | \$3.31 | \$4.63 | \$1.31 | 3.2% |
| Ancillary Service Redispatch Cost | \$0.35 | \$1.45 | \$1.11 | 2.7% |
| Emergency Demand Response | \$0.00 | \$1.75 | \$1.75 | 4.3% |
| PJM Administrative Cap | \$0.00 | (\$1.39) | (\$1.39) | (3.5%) |
| All Other | \$2.28 | \$3.67 | \$1.39 | 3.4% |
| Total | \$39.78 | \$80.14 | \$40.36 | 100.0% |

Components of LMP increase

- **\$40.36 per MWh increase in the real-time load weighted average LMP**
- **\$22.82 per MWh (56.6 percent) was an increase in the fuel and consumables cost components of LMP**
- **\$3.71 per MWh (9.2 percent) was an increase in the emissions cost components of LMP**
- **\$4.83 per MWh (12.0 percent) was an increase in the sum of the markup, maintenance, and ten percent adder components of LMP**
- **\$4.83 per MWh (12.0 percent) was an increase in the scarcity component of LMP**
- **\$1.31 per MWh (3.2 percent) was an increase in the transmission constraint penalty factor component of LMP**

Recommendations: Energy Market


- **The day-ahead energy market must offer requirement equal to ICAP for capacity resources should be enforced.**
- **Fuel cost policies should be verifiable and enforceable. All resources should be required to follow their fuel cost policies at all times.**
- **The loopholes in offer capping implementation should be closed.**
- **Virtual bidding should be eliminated at nodes that aggregate only small portions of the transmission system.**

Recommendations: Energy Market

- **Major maintenance should not be included in cost-based offers**
- **PJM should not reduce line ratings in SCED to trigger transmission constraint penalty factor.**



Real-time daily load: 2021 and 2022



RT load and load plus exports

| | PJM Real-Time Demand (MWh) | | | | Year to Year Change | | | |
|------|----------------------------|-----------|-------------------|-----------|---------------------|-----------|-------------------|-----------|
| | Load | | Load Plus Exports | | Load | | Load Plus Exports | |
| | Standard | Standard | Standard | Standard | Standard | Standard | Standard | Standard |
| | Load | Deviation | Demand | Deviation | Load | Deviation | Demand | Deviation |
| 2001 | 30,297 | 5,873 | 32,165 | 5,564 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 2002 | 35,776 | 7,976 | 37,676 | 8,145 | 18.1% | 35.8% | 17.1% | 46.4% |
| 2003 | 37,395 | 6,834 | 39,380 | 6,716 | 4.5% | (14.3%) | 4.5% | (17.5%) |
| 2004 | 49,963 | 13,004 | 54,953 | 14,947 | 33.6% | 90.3% | 39.5% | 122.6% |
| 2005 | 78,150 | 16,296 | 85,301 | 16,546 | 56.4% | 25.3% | 55.2% | 10.7% |
| 2006 | 79,471 | 14,534 | 85,696 | 15,133 | 1.7% | (10.8%) | 0.5% | (8.5%) |
| 2007 | 81,681 | 14,618 | 87,897 | 15,199 | 2.8% | 0.6% | 2.6% | 0.4% |
| 2008 | 79,515 | 13,758 | 86,306 | 14,322 | (2.7%) | (5.9%) | (1.8%) | (5.8%) |
| 2009 | 76,034 | 13,260 | 81,227 | 13,792 | (4.4%) | (3.6%) | (5.9%) | (3.7%) |
| 2010 | 79,611 | 15,504 | 85,518 | 15,904 | 4.7% | 16.9% | 5.3% | 15.3% |
| 2011 | 82,541 | 16,156 | 88,466 | 16,313 | 3.7% | 4.2% | 3.4% | 2.6% |
| 2012 | 87,011 | 16,212 | 92,135 | 16,052 | 5.4% | 0.3% | 4.1% | (1.6%) |
| 2013 | 88,332 | 15,489 | 92,879 | 15,418 | 1.5% | (4.5%) | 0.8% | (3.9%) |
| 2014 | 89,099 | 15,763 | 94,471 | 15,677 | 0.9% | 1.8% | 1.7% | 1.7% |
| 2015 | 88,594 | 16,663 | 92,665 | 16,784 | (0.6%) | 5.7% | (1.9%) | 7.1% |
| 2016 | 88,601 | 17,229 | 93,551 | 17,498 | 0.0% | 3.4% | 1.0% | 4.3% |
| 2017 | 86,618 | 15,170 | 91,015 | 15,083 | (2.2%) | (11.9%) | (2.7%) | (13.8%) |
| 2018 | 90,308 | 15,982 | 94,351 | 16,142 | 4.3% | 5.4% | 3.7% | 7.0% |
| 2019 | 88,120 | 15,867 | 92,920 | 16,085 | (2.4%) | (0.7%) | (1.5%) | (0.4%) |
| 2020 | 84,584 | 16,016 | 90,059 | 16,233 | (4.0%) | 0.9% | (3.1%) | 0.9% |
| 2021 | 87,606 | 15,725 | 92,774 | 16,485 | 3.6% | (1.8%) | 3.0% | 1.6% |
| 2022 | 88,884 | 15,689 | 94,301 | 16,047 | 1.5% | (0.2%) | 1.6% | (2.7%) |


Generation by fuel source

| | 2021 | | 2022 | | Change in Output |
|-------------------------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|------------------|
| | GWh | Percent | GWh | Percent | |
| Coal | 184,412.3 | 22.2% | 167,650.0 | 20.0% | (9.1%) |
| Bituminous | 163,753.6 | 19.7% | 144,880.5 | 17.2% | (11.5%) |
| Sub Bituminous | 14,421.7 | 1.7% | 16,210.5 | 1.9% | 12.4% |
| Other Coal | 6,237.0 | 0.7% | 6,558.9 | 0.8% | 5.2% |
| Nuclear | 272,670.4 | 32.8% | 271,522.1 | 32.3% | (0.4%) |
| Gas | 314,885.1 | 37.9% | 335,974.2 | 40.0% | 6.7% |
| Natural Gas CC | 289,136.6 | 34.8% | 309,420.5 | 36.8% | 7.0% |
| Natural Gas CT | 19,894.4 | 2.4% | 18,581.9 | 2.2% | (6.6%) |
| Natural Gas Other Units | 4,132.1 | 0.5% | 6,501.5 | 0.8% | 57.3% |
| Other Gas | 1,722.0 | 0.2% | 1,470.4 | 0.2% | (14.6%) |
| Hydroelectric | 16,624.8 | 2.0% | 15,995.8 | 1.9% | (3.8%) |
| Pumped Storage | 5,037.3 | 0.6% | 6,092.9 | 0.7% | 21.0% |
| Run of River | 10,278.6 | 1.2% | 7,945.5 | 0.9% | (22.7%) |
| Other Hydro | 1,308.9 | 0.2% | 1,957.4 | 0.2% | 49.6% |
| Wind | 27,651.4 | 3.3% | 31,491.0 | 3.7% | 13.9% |
| Waste | 4,475.9 | 0.5% | 4,056.0 | 0.5% | (9.4%) |
| Oil | 2,290.7 | 0.3% | 2,698.9 | 0.3% | 17.8% |
| Heavy Oil | 65.6 | 0.0% | 76.4 | 0.0% | 16.4% |
| Light Oil | 524.4 | 0.1% | 878.9 | 0.1% | 67.6% |
| Diesel | 27.7 | 0.0% | 163.1 | 0.0% | 489.3% |
| Other Oil | 1,673.1 | 0.2% | 1,580.5 | 0.2% | (5.5%) |
| Solar | 7,412.2 | 0.9% | 9,243.0 | 1.1% | 24.7% |
| Battery | 36.5 | 0.0% | 25.4 | 0.0% | (30.2%) |
| Biofuel | 1,191.7 | 0.1% | 1,371.1 | 0.2% | 15.1% |
| Total | 831,650.8 | 100.0% | 840,027.6 | 100.0% | 1.0% |


Real-time hourly average load

| | PJM Real-Time Demand (MWh) | | | | Year to Year Change | | | |
|------|----------------------------|-----------|-------------------|-----------|---------------------|-----------|-------------------|-----------|
| | Load | | Load Plus Exports | | Load | | Load Plus Exports | |
| | Standard | | Standard | | Standard | | Standard | |
| | Load | Deviation | Demand | Deviation | Load | Deviation | Demand | Deviation |
| 2001 | 30,297 | 5,873 | 32,165 | 5,564 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 2002 | 35,776 | 7,976 | 37,676 | 8,145 | 18.1% | 35.8% | 17.1% | 46.4% |
| 2003 | 37,395 | 6,834 | 39,380 | 6,716 | 4.5% | (14.3%) | 4.5% | (17.5%) |
| 2004 | 49,963 | 13,004 | 54,953 | 14,947 | 33.6% | 90.3% | 39.5% | 122.6% |
| 2005 | 78,150 | 16,296 | 85,301 | 16,546 | 56.4% | 25.3% | 55.2% | 10.7% |
| 2006 | 79,471 | 14,534 | 85,696 | 15,133 | 1.7% | (10.8%) | 0.5% | (8.5%) |
| 2007 | 81,681 | 14,618 | 87,897 | 15,199 | 2.8% | 0.6% | 2.6% | 0.4% |
| 2008 | 79,515 | 13,758 | 86,306 | 14,322 | (2.7%) | (5.9%) | (1.8%) | (5.8%) |
| 2009 | 76,034 | 13,260 | 81,227 | 13,792 | (4.4%) | (3.6%) | (5.9%) | (3.7%) |
| 2010 | 79,611 | 15,504 | 85,518 | 15,904 | 4.7% | 16.9% | 5.3% | 15.3% |
| 2011 | 82,541 | 16,156 | 88,466 | 16,313 | 3.7% | 4.2% | 3.4% | 2.6% |
| 2012 | 87,011 | 16,212 | 92,135 | 16,052 | 5.4% | 0.3% | 4.1% | (1.6%) |
| 2013 | 88,332 | 15,489 | 92,879 | 15,418 | 1.5% | (4.5%) | 0.8% | (3.9%) |
| 2014 | 89,099 | 15,763 | 94,471 | 15,677 | 0.9% | 1.8% | 1.7% | 1.7% |
| 2015 | 88,594 | 16,663 | 92,665 | 16,784 | (0.6%) | 5.7% | (1.9%) | 7.1% |
| 2016 | 88,601 | 17,229 | 93,551 | 17,498 | 0.0% | 3.4% | 1.0% | 4.3% |
| 2017 | 86,618 | 15,170 | 91,015 | 15,083 | (2.2%) | (11.9%) | (2.7%) | (13.8%) |
| 2018 | 90,308 | 15,982 | 94,351 | 16,142 | 4.3% | 5.4% | 3.7% | 7.0% |
| 2019 | 88,120 | 15,867 | 92,920 | 16,085 | (2.4%) | (0.7%) | (1.5%) | (0.4%) |
| 2020 | 84,584 | 16,016 | 90,059 | 16,233 | (4.0%) | 0.9% | (3.1%) | 0.9% |
| 2021 | 87,606 | 15,725 | 92,774 | 16,485 | 3.6% | (1.8%) | 3.0% | 1.6% |
| 2022 | 88,884 | 15,689 | 94,301 | 16,047 | 1.5% | (0.2%) | 1.6% | (2.7%) |

RT generation less RT load




Average short run marginal costs



Type of fuel used by real-time marginal units




Pivotal suppliers: day-ahead energy market



Marginal units with markup and local market power

| Markup Category | Day-ahead Market | | | Real-time Market | | |
|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------|---------------------|----------------------|------------------|---------------------|
| | Not Failing TPS Test | Failing TPS Test | Percent in Category | Not Failing TPS Test | Failing TPS Test | Percent in Category |
| Negative Markup | 22.3% | 4.1% | 26.4% | 30.8% | 7.9% | 38.7% |
| Zero Markup | 15.7% | 4.8% | 20.5% | 15.2% | 8.5% | 23.7% |
| \$0 to \$5 | 12.3% | 1.4% | 13.6% | 15.5% | 3.0% | 18.5% |
| \$5 to \$10 | 7.6% | 1.1% | 8.6% | 6.1% | 0.8% | 6.9% |
| \$10 to \$15 | 6.6% | 0.9% | 7.5% | 2.9% | 0.4% | 3.4% |
| \$15 to \$20 | 5.2% | 0.6% | 5.8% | 2.5% | 0.3% | 2.8% |
| \$20 to \$25 | 4.5% | 0.5% | 5.0% | 1.5% | 0.2% | 1.8% |
| \$25 to \$50 | 7.3% | 1.1% | 8.3% | 2.4% | 0.5% | 2.9% |
| \$50 to \$75 | 2.2% | 0.5% | 2.7% | 0.5% | 0.2% | 0.7% |
| \$75 to \$100 | 0.6% | 0.1% | 0.8% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.3% |
| Above \$100 | 0.5% | 0.1% | 0.6% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.4% |
| Total Positive Markup | 46.7% | 6.4% | 53.1% | 31.9% | 5.8% | 37.7% |
| Total | 84.8% | 15.2% | 100.0% | 77.9% | 22.1% | 100.0% |


UTC cleared bids



Total congestion costs

| | Congestion Cost | Percent Change | Total PJM Billing | Percent of PJM Billing |
|------|-----------------|----------------|-------------------|------------------------|
| 2008 | \$2,052 | NA | \$34,300 | 6.0% |
| 2009 | \$719 | (65.0%) | \$26,550 | 2.7% |
| 2010 | \$1,423 | 98.0% | \$34,770 | 4.1% |
| 2011 | \$999 | (29.8%) | \$35,890 | 2.8% |
| 2012 | \$529 | (47.0%) | \$29,180 | 1.8% |
| 2013 | \$677 | 28.0% | \$33,860 | 2.0% |
| 2014 | \$1,932 | 185.5% | \$50,030 | 3.9% |
| 2015 | \$1,385 | (28.3%) | \$42,630 | 3.2% |
| 2016 | \$1,024 | (26.1%) | \$39,050 | 2.6% |
| 2017 | \$698 | (31.9%) | \$40,170 | 1.7% |
| 2018 | \$1,310 | 87.8% | \$49,790 | 2.6% |
| 2019 | \$583 | (55.5%) | \$41,680 | 1.4% |
| 2020 | \$529 | (9.4%) | \$36,280 | 1.5% |
| 2021 | \$995 | 88.2% | \$54,130 | 1.8% |
| 2022 | \$2,501 | 151.3% | \$86,220 | 2.9% |

Average tier 1 REC price by jurisdiction



Renewable energy credits (RECs)

- **There should be a single PJM operated forward market for RECs, for a single product based on a common set of state definitions of renewable technologies, with a single clearing price, trued up to real time delivery.**
- **Only if states agree.**
- **Cleared separately from PJM energy market and PJM capacity market.**


The capacity market results were competitive

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| Market Structure: Aggregate Market | Not Competitive | |
| Market Structure: Local Market | Not Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Competitive | |
| Market Performance | Competitive | Mixed |


Capacity market issues

- **Capacity performance design**
- **Market seller offer cap**
- **Forward looking energy net revenue offset**
- **VRR curve shape and location**
- **Definition of capacity**
- **Intermittent capacity definition: ELCC**
- **DR/EE**
- **MOPR**
- **Reserve margin**


VRR curve Impacts: 2023/2024 Delivery Year



Installed capacity by fuel source




History of capacity prices




Map of RPM capacity prices


2020/2021




2021/2022



2022/2023



2023/2024



2023/2024 RPM BRA: RPM revenue impacts

| Scenario | Scenario Description | Scenario Impact | | |
|----------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------|
| | | RPM Revenue (\$ per Delivery Year) | RPM Revenue (\$ per Delivery Year) | Percent |
| 0 | Actual Results | \$2,196,444,791 | NA | NA |
| 1 | Downward sloping VRR curve | \$1,212,977,260 | \$983,467,530 | 81.1% |
| 2 | Modified VRR curve | \$1,790,941,751 | \$405,503,039 | 22.6% |
| 3 | Over forecast peak load | \$1,729,724,427 | \$466,720,364 | 27.0% |
| 4 | Change in ComEd CETL | \$2,196,444,791 | \$0 | 0.0% |
| 5 | Change in MAAC CETL | \$2,191,931,381 | \$4,513,409 | 0.2% |
| 6 | Overstated intermittent capacity | \$2,254,726,706 | (\$58,281,915) | (2.6%) |
| 7 | Demand resources | \$4,111,765,958 | (\$1,915,321,168) | (46.6%) |
| 8 | EE offers and EE add back | \$2,114,675,175 | \$81,769,616 | 3.9% |
| 9 | PRD | \$2,206,858,085 | (\$10,413,294) | (0.5%) |
| 10 | Seasonal products | \$2,277,928,225 | (\$81,483,434) | (3.6%) |
| 11 | Seasonal matching across LDAs | \$2,195,770,974 | \$673,816 | 0.0% |
| 12 | Capacity imports | \$2,288,709,765 | (\$92,264,974) | (4.0%) |
| 13 | Combined scenarios 6,7,8,9,10,12 | \$4,919,185,790 | (\$2,722,740,999) | (55.3%) |
| 14 | Nuclear offers | \$2,196,444,791 | \$0 | 0.0% |
| 15 | Combined scenarios 2,6,7,12 | \$2,901,559,097 | (\$705,114,306) | (24.3%) |

2023/2024 RPM BRA: RPM cleared UCAP MW impacts

| Scenario | Scenario Description | Cleared UCAP (MW) | Scenario Impact | |
|----------|----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------|
| | | | Cleared UCAP (MW) | Percent |
| 0 | Actual Results | 144,870.6 | NA | NA |
| 1 | Downward sloping VRR curve | 131,564.3 | 13,306.3 | 10.1% |
| 2 | Modified VRR curve | 141,119.4 | 3,751.2 | 2.7% |
| 3 | Over forecast peak load | 139,895.0 | 4,975.6 | 3.6% |
| 4 | Change in ComEd CETL | 144,870.6 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| 5 | Change in MAAC CETL | 145,199.1 | (328.5) | (0.2%) |
| 6 | Overstated intermittent capacity | 144,828.9 | 41.7 | 0.0% |
| 7 | Demand resources | 143,568.3 | 1,302.2 | 0.9% |
| 8 | EE offers and EE add back | 139,399.5 | 5,471.1 | 3.9% |
| 9 | PRD | 145,126.7 | (256.1) | (0.2%) |
| 10 | Seasonal products | 144,526.3 | 344.3 | 0.2% |
| 11 | Seasonal matching across LDAs | 144,814.6 | 56.0 | 0.0% |
| 12 | Capacity imports | 144,768.4 | 102.2 | 0.1% |
| 13 | Combined scenarios 6,7,8,9,10,12 | 137,535.0 | 7,335.6 | 5.3% |
| 14 | Nuclear offers | 144,870.6 | 0.0 | 0.0% |
| 15 | Combined scenarios 2,6,7,12 | 140,596.2 | 4,274.4 | 3.0% |

Reserve margin: 2023/2024 RPM BRA

| Reserve Margin Calculation | | |
|--|-----------|-----------------|
| Forecast peak load ICAP (MW) | 149,680.0 | A |
| FRR peak load ICAP (MW) | 28,755.0 | B |
| PRD ICAP (MW) | 235.0 | C |
| Installed reserve margin (IRM) | 14.8% | D |
| Pool-wide average EFORd | 5.04% | E |
| Forecast pool requirement (FPR) | 1.0901 | $F=(1+D)*(1-E)$ |
| Cleared UCAP (generation and DR) | 139,399.5 | G |
| Cleared ICAP (generation and DR) | 146,798.1 | $H=G/(1-E)$ |
| RPM peak load ICAP (MW) | 120,690.0 | $J=A-B-C$ |
| Reserve margin ICAP (MW) | 26,108.1 | $K=H-J$ |
| Reserve margin (%) | 21.6% | $L=K/J$ |
| Reserve cleared in excess of IRM ICAP (MW) | 8,246.0 | $M=K-D*J$ |
| Reserve cleared in excess of IRM (%) | 6.8% | $N=M/J$ |
| RPM peak load UCAP (MW) | 114,607.2 | $P=J*(1-E)$ |
| RPM reliability requirement UCAP (MW) | 131,564.2 | $Q=J*F$ |
| Reserve margin UCAP (MW) | 24,792.3 | $R=G-P$ |
| Reserve cleared in excess of IRM UCAP (MW) | 7,835.3 | $S=G-Q$ |

RPM reserve margin: June 1, 2018, to June 1, 2023

| | 01-Jun-18 | 01-Jun-19 | 01-Jun-20 | 01-Jun-21 | 01-Jun-22 | 01-Jun-23 | |
|---|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------------------|
| Forecast peak load ICAP (MW) | 152,407.9 | 151,643.5 | 148,355.3 | 149,482.9 | 149,263.6 | 149,680.0 | A |
| FRR peak load ICAP (MW) | 12,732.9 | 12,284.2 | 11,488.3 | 11,717.7 | 28,292.8 | 28,755.0 | B |
| PRD ICAP (MW) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 558.0 | 510.0 | 230.0 | 235.0 | C |
| Installed reserve margin (IRM) | 16.1% | 16.0% | 15.5% | 14.7% | 14.9% | 14.8% | D |
| Pool wide average EFORd | 6.07% | 6.08% | 5.78% | 5.22% | 5.08% | 5.04% | E |
| Forecast pool requirement (FPR) | 1.0905 | 1.0895 | 1.0882 | 1.0871 | 1.0906 | 1.0901 | $F=(1+D)*(1-E)$ |
| RPM committed less deficiency UCAP (MW) (generation and DR) | 161,242.6 | 162,276.1 | 159,560.4 | 156,633.6 | 137,944.8 | 140,017.0 | G |
| RPM committed less deficiency ICAP (MW) (generation and DR) | 171,662.5 | 172,781.2 | 169,348.8 | 165,260.2 | 145,327.4 | 147,448.4 | $H=G/(1-E)$ |
| RPM peak load ICAP (MW) | 139,675.0 | 139,359.3 | 136,309.0 | 137,255.2 | 120,740.8 | 120,690.0 | $J=A-B-C$ |
| Reserve margin ICAP (MW) | 31,987.5 | 33,421.9 | 33,039.8 | 28,005.0 | 24,586.6 | 26,758.4 | $K=H-J$ |
| Reserve margin (%) | 22.9% | 24.0% | 24.2% | 20.4% | 20.4% | 22.2% | $L=K/J$ |
| Reserve margin in excess of IRM ICAP (MW) | 9,499.8 | 11,124.4 | 11,911.9 | 7,828.5 | 6,596.3 | 8,896.3 | $M=K-D*J$ |
| Reserve margin in excess of IRM (%) | 6.8% | 8.0% | 8.7% | 5.7% | 5.5% | 7.4% | $N=M/J$ |
| RPM peak load UCAP (MW) | 131,196.7 | 130,886.3 | 128,430.3 | 130,090.5 | 114,607.2 | 114,607.2 | $P=J*(1-E)$ |
| RPM reliability requirement UCAP (MW) | 152,315.6 | 151,832.0 | 148,331.5 | 149,210.1 | 131,679.9 | 131,564.2 | $Q=J*F$ |
| Reserve margin UCAP (MW) | 30,045.9 | 31,389.8 | 31,130.1 | 26,543.1 | 23,337.6 | 25,409.8 | $R=G-P$ |
| Reserve cleared in excess of IRM UCAP (MW) | 8,927.0 | 10,444.1 | 11,228.9 | 7,423.5 | 6,264.9 | 8,452.8 | $S=G-Q$ |
| Projected replacement capacity UCAP (MW) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | T |
| Projected reserve margin | 22.9% | 24.0% | 24.2% | 20.4% | 20.4% | 22.2% | $U=(H-T)/(1-E)/J-1$ |

Reserve margin

- **Total reserves: 24,792.3 MW**
- **Required reserves: 16,957.0**
- **Excess reserves: 7,835.3**
- **Cleared DR: 8,203.3 MW**
 - **104.7 percent of excess reserves**
- **Cleared capacity with no must offer requirement: 7,534.3 MW**
 - **96.2 percent of excess reserves**
- **Sum of DR and no must offer: 15,737.6 MW**
 - **92.8 percent of required reserves**
 - **63.5 percent of total reserves**
- **Total capacity with no must offer requirement: 17,037.1 MW**

Reliability and Markets: Issues

- **Apparent excess reserves are not robust**
 - **Coal retirements (environmental/not economics)**
 - **Uncertainty about new capacity: renewables and gas**
- **Solution is to focus on reinforcing the fundamentals of the capacity market: reliable price signals**
 - **Aggregate**
 - **Locational**
- **Solution is not one off tweaks to capacity market parameters**
- **Solution is not to weaken market power mitigation rules (PJM's MSOC proposal weakens mitigation).**
- **Prices were not too low in 2023/2024 BRA.**


Capacity market basics

- **The capacity market is a competitive mechanism that exists to make the energy market work.**
- **What are the essential, realistic, implementable elements of a capacity market design?**

Reliability and Markets: Issues

- **Correcting/defining the role/obligations of demand response resources is key to a workable capacity market.**
 - **Should look like any other supply side resource.**
 - **Economic resource. Not emergency resource.**
 - **Must offer in energy market.**
 - **Offer caps and same rules for all offers.**
 - **Must be available.**
- **Potential issues for PJM system control and markets if DER follows the demand response model.**
- **Role/obligations of energy efficiency (EE) resources.**
 - **EE should not be part of capacity market per PJM rules.**

Fuel Diversity Index for installed capacity




Effective capacity in interconnection queues

| Unit Type | MW in Queue | Completion Rate Adjusted MW in Queue | Completion Rate and ELCC Adjusted MW in Queue |
|------------------------|-------------|---|---|
| Battery | 52,926.0 | 1,328.7 | 1,102.8 |
| CC | 12,767.4 | 7,799.0 | 7,799.0 |
| CT - Natural Gas | 5,002.3 | 3,396.3 | 3,396.3 |
| CT - Oil | 9.0 | 8.2 | 8.2 |
| CT - Other | 392.9 | 33.0 | 33.0 |
| Fuel Cell | 8.0 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
| Hydro - Pumped Storage | 730.0 | 707.2 | 707.2 |
| Hydro - Run of River | 112.8 | 52.3 | 52.3 |
| Nuclear | 98.2 | 45.4 | 45.4 |
| RICE - Natural Gas | 14.4 | 3.7 | 3.7 |
| RICE - Oil | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| RICE - Other | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Solar | 128,320.3 | 20,712.9 | 11,185.0 |
| Solar + Storage | 40,179.0 | 33.8 | 18.2 |
| Solar + Wind | 209.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Coal | 65.0 | 23.1 | 23.1 |
| Steam - Natural Gas | 5.0 | 4.6 | 4.6 |
| Steam - Oil | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Steam - Other | 20.0 | 5.4 | 5.4 |
| Wind | 46,393.4 | 6,964.0 | 1,044.6 |
| Wind + Storage | 240.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Total | 287,492.7 | 41,120.1 | 25,431.3 |


Proportion of units recovering avoidable costs

| Technology | Units with full recovery from energy and ancillary net revenue | | | | | | | | | | | | Units with full recovery from all markets | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 |
| CC - Combined Cycle | 55% | 46% | 50% | 72% | 59% | 63% | 57% | 66% | 64% | 67% | 50% | 72% | 85% | 79% | 79% | 95% | 88% | 93% | 89% | 98% | 90% | 93% | 83% | 80% |
| CT - Aero Derivative | 15% | 6% | 6% | 53% | 15% | 8% | 10% | 30% | 46% | 42% | 2% | 7% | 100% | 96% | 76% | 98% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 99% | 96% | 96% | 89% | 33% |
| CT - Industrial Frame | 26% | 23% | 17% | 38% | 13% | 8% | 3% | 21% | 30% | 21% | 2% | 6% | 99% | 98% | 83% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 96% | 92% | 86% | 84% | 27% |
| Coal Fired | 31% | 17% | 27% | 78% | 16% | 15% | 12% | 11% | 2% | 2% | 22% | 27% | 82% | 36% | 54% | 83% | 64% | 40% | 36% | 63% | 31% | 5% | 66% | 33% |
| Diesel | 48% | 42% | 37% | 69% | 56% | 33% | 32% | 39% | 11% | 37% | 25% | 35% | 100% | 100% | 77% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 97% | 91% | 89% | 83% | 83% |
| Hydro | 74% | 61% | 95% | 97% | 81% | 79% | 95% | 94% | 90% | 72% | 95% | 100% | 81% | 77% | 97% | 98% | 100% | 100% | 97% | 98% | 100% | 74% | 95% | 100% |
| Nuclear | - | - | 50% | 94% | 17% | 6% | 17% | 53% | 0% | 0% | 88% | 100% | - | - | 61% | 100% | 56% | 17% | 50% | 88% | 81% | 0% | 100% | 100% |
| Oil or Gas Steam | 8% | 6% | 11% | 15% | 3% | 0% | 0% | 10% | 73% | 6% | 10% | 10% | 92% | 78% | 86% | 85% | 91% | 88% | 81% | 76% | 66% | 34% | 67% | 10% |
| Pumped Storage | 100% | 100% | 95% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 29% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Solar | - | 95% | 97% | 99% | 97% | 95% | 95% | 98% | 96% | 95% | 100% | 97% | - | 95% | 97% | 99% | 97% | 95% | 95% | 98% | 96% | 95% | 100% | 97% |
| Wind | 88% | 85% | 96% | 93% | 92% | 89% | 93% | 91% | 88% | 79% | 94% | 99% | 88% | 85% | 96% | 93% | 92% | 89% | 93% | 91% | 89% | 79% | 95% | 99% |


New entrant CT net revenue and total cost by LDA



New entrant CC net revenue and total cost by LDA



New entrant CP net revenue and total cost by LDA



New entrant nuclear plant net revenue and total cost by LDA



Nuclear unit surplus (shortfall)

| | ICAP (MW) | Surplus (Shortfall) (\$/MWh) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|--------------|------------------------------|---------|--------|---------|----------|---------|--------|---------|----------|----------|---------|---------|----------|--------|--------|
| | | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 |
| Beaver Valley | 1,808 | \$26.3 | \$6.3 | \$10.5 | \$8.8 | (\$3.3) | \$1.4 | \$11.7 | \$3.2 | (\$0.4) | \$2.6 | \$13.9 | \$3.7 | (\$2.7) | \$15.0 | \$45.1 |
| Braidwood | 2,337 | \$24.9 | \$2.5 | \$6.4 | \$3.4 | (\$6.1) | (\$2.6) | \$7.2 | (\$1.2) | (\$3.2) | (\$1.6) | \$5.9 | \$3.9 | (\$0.0) | \$15.1 | \$39.1 |
| Byron | 2,300 | \$24.5 | (\$1.3) | \$3.4 | (\$0.6) | (\$9.4) | (\$3.6) | \$4.9 | (\$6.1) | (\$9.6) | (\$2.8) | \$5.8 | \$3.2 | (\$0.6) | \$14.1 | \$38.7 |
| Calvert Cliffs | 1,726 | \$60.6 | \$20.9 | \$28.6 | \$17.9 | \$4.5 | \$14.6 | \$31.6 | \$14.1 | \$7.2 | \$6.1 | \$16.3 | \$5.4 | (\$0.9) | \$19.4 | \$57.6 |
| Davis Besse | 894 | NA | NA | NA | NA | (\$13.2) | (\$7.0) | \$6.6 | (\$1.2) | (\$4.0) | (\$8.4) | (\$0.9) | (\$6.3) | (\$15.1) | \$5.9 | \$36.5 |
| Dresden | 1,797 | \$25.6 | \$3.0 | \$7.6 | \$4.4 | (\$5.2) | (\$1.0) | \$9.1 | \$0.3 | (\$1.5) | (\$0.1) | \$7.1 | \$4.5 | \$0.5 | \$15.7 | \$40.3 |
| Hope Creek | 1,172 | \$54.0 | \$17.0 | \$24.5 | \$16.9 | \$2.6 | \$12.4 | \$26.0 | \$6.3 | (\$1.9) | \$1.6 | \$12.3 | \$1.8 | (\$2.2) | \$11.0 | \$40.6 |
| LaSalle | 2,265 | \$24.8 | \$2.5 | \$6.4 | \$3.3 | (\$6.1) | (\$1.9) | \$7.7 | (\$0.9) | (\$3.6) | (\$1.9) | \$6.0 | \$3.7 | (\$0.2) | \$14.8 | \$38.8 |
| Limerick | 2,242 | \$54.1 | \$17.1 | \$24.7 | \$16.6 | \$2.6 | \$12.2 | \$25.7 | \$6.5 | (\$2.1) | \$1.5 | \$12.1 | \$1.6 | (\$2.6) | \$11.6 | \$41.0 |
| North Anna | 1,892 | \$52.0 | \$14.6 | \$25.5 | \$16.8 | \$0.2 | \$5.7 | \$23.2 | \$10.9 | \$3.0 | \$4.7 | \$16.0 | \$4.8 | (\$2.0) | \$17.9 | NA |
| Oyster Creek | 608 | \$47.5 | \$8.4 | \$15.9 | \$7.2 | (\$8.2) | \$3.3 | \$16.4 | (\$4.7) | (\$11.6) | (\$9.9) | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Peach Bottom | 2,550 | \$53.7 | \$16.9 | \$24.2 | \$16.1 | \$2.3 | \$12.3 | \$25.5 | \$5.8 | (\$2.2) | \$1.4 | \$11.9 | \$0.7 | (\$2.7) | \$11.5 | \$41.1 |
| Perry | 1,240 | NA | NA | NA | NA | (\$13.2) | (\$6.4) | \$5.5 | (\$0.3) | (\$4.0) | (\$7.4) | \$1.9 | (\$5.8) | (\$15.1) | \$6.3 | \$37.1 |
| Quad Cities | 1,819 | \$24.1 | (\$0.4) | \$2.4 | (\$1.8) | (\$13.2) | (\$6.9) | \$0.6 | (\$7.7) | (\$9.5) | (\$3.5) | \$4.3 | \$2.1 | (\$2.4) | \$12.7 | \$38.9 |
| Salem | 2,285 | \$54.0 | \$17.1 | \$24.5 | \$16.9 | \$2.6 | \$12.4 | \$26.0 | \$6.2 | (\$2.1) | \$1.5 | \$12.2 | \$1.6 | (\$2.3) | \$10.9 | \$40.4 |
| Surry | 1,676 | \$48.8 | \$13.8 | \$24.2 | \$16.4 | (\$0.0) | \$5.1 | \$21.6 | \$10.8 | \$2.6 | \$4.5 | \$16.0 | \$4.1 | (\$2.6) | \$17.2 | NA |
| Susquehanna | 2,494 | \$46.8 | \$15.2 | \$22.4 | \$16.1 | \$1.4 | \$11.1 | \$24.6 | \$6.3 | (\$1.6) | \$1.8 | \$10.1 | (\$1.4) | (\$6.6) | \$8.6 | \$38.6 |
| Three Mile Island | 803 | \$40.7 | \$6.5 | \$13.3 | \$4.6 | (\$9.6) | \$0.9 | \$13.7 | (\$6.8) | (\$12.4) | (\$10.3) | (\$3.8) | NA | NA | NA | NA |

Nuclear unit forward annual surplus (shortfall)

| | ICAP (MW) | Surplus (Shortfall) (\$/MWh) 2023 | Subsidy (\$/MWh) 2023 | Surplus (Shortfall) Excluding Subsidy (\$ in millions) 2023 | Surplus (Shortfall) Including Subsidy (\$ in millions) 2023 |
|----------------|--------------|---|-----------------------------|--|--|
| Beaver Valley | 1,808 | \$52.90 | | \$775.5 | \$775.5 |
| Braidwood | 2,337 | \$44.44 | \$0.00 | \$801.3 | \$801.3 |
| Byron | 2,300 | \$39.48 | \$0.00 | \$694.0 | \$694.0 |
| Calvert Cliffs | 1,726 | \$62.47 | | \$891.5 | \$891.5 |
| Davis Besse | 894 | \$41.88 | | \$300.1 | \$300.1 |
| Dresden | 1,797 | \$45.79 | \$0.00 | \$636.3 | \$636.3 |
| Hope Creek | 1,172 | \$37.82 | \$10.00 | \$346.9 | \$444.0 |
| LaSalle | 2,265 | \$43.98 | \$0.00 | \$767.8 | \$767.8 |
| Limerick | 2,242 | \$42.46 | | \$749.8 | \$749.8 |
| North Anna | 1,892 | \$60.02 | | NA | NA |
| Peach Bottom | 2,550 | \$42.41 | | \$851.8 | \$851.8 |
| Perry | 1,240 | \$44.60 | | \$444.2 | \$444.2 |
| Quad Cities | 1,819 | \$36.92 | \$16.50 | \$510.3 | \$759.0 |
| Salem | 2,285 | \$37.70 | \$10.00 | \$674.0 | \$863.4 |
| Surry | 1,676 | \$58.74 | | NA | NA |
| Susquehanna | 2,494 | \$40.49 | | \$833.9 | \$833.9 |

Units at risk of retirement

| | MW expected to retire | | | | | | | | | Total MW 2023-2030 |
|---|-----------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|----------|--------------|----------|-----------------------|
| | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | | |
| MW requested deactivation | | | | | | | | | | |
| Coal | 3,774 | 0 | 0 | 410 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4,184 |
| Natural Gas | 1,459 | 132 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,590 |
| Other | 853 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 853 |
| Total MW requested deactivation | 6,086 | 132 | 0 | 410 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6,628 |
| MW expected to retire for regulatory reasons | | | | | | | | | | |
| Coal | 2,557 | 2,863 | 2,766 | 1,359 | 652 | 3,605 | 0 | 180 | | 13,982 |
| Natural Gas | 320 | 318 | 0 | 1,027 | 2,375 | 0 | 0 | 4,900 | | 8,940 |
| Other | 0 | 554 | 0 | 33 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 587 |
| Total MW expected to retire for regulatory reasons | 2,877 | 3,736 | 2,766 | 2,419 | 3,027 | 3,605 | 0 | 5,080 | | 23,509 |
| Additional MW uneconomic 2023-2025 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Coal | | | | | | | | | | 9,444 |
| Natural Gas | | | | | | | | | | 9,011 |
| Other | | | | | | | | | | 3,166 |
| Total MW uneconomic | | | | | | | | | | 21,621 |
| Total | | | | | | | | | | |
| Coal | 6,331 | 2,863 | 2,766 | 1,769 | 652 | 3,605 | 0 | 180 | | 27,610 |
| Natural Gas | 1,779 | 450 | 0 | 1,027 | 2,375 | 0 | 0 | 4,900 | | 19,541 |
| Other | 853 | 554 | 0 | 33 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 4,606 |
| Total MW At Risk of Retirement | 8,963 | 3,867 | 2,766 | 2,829 | 3,027 | 3,605 | 0 | 5,080 | | 51,757 |

Historical retirements and expected retirements

| | MW Retired | | | | | | | | | | | | | MW at Risk |
|-----------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|
| | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2011-2022 | 2023-2030 |
| Coal | 543 | 5,908 | 2,590 | 2,239 | 7,065 | 243 | 2,038 | 3,167 | 4,111 | 2,132 | 1,020 | 5,385 | 36,440 | 27,610 |
| Natural Gas | 523 | 250 | 82 | 294 | 1,319 | 74 | 34 | 1,441 | 447 | 233 | 220 | 340 | 5,256 | 19,541 |
| Other | 131 | 804 | 187 | 437 | 879 | 83 | 41 | 935 | 899 | 891 | 70 | 440 | 5,797 | 4,606 |
| Total MW | 1,197 | 6,962 | 2,859 | 2,970 | 9,263 | 400 | 2,113 | 5,543 | 5,456 | 3,255 | 1,310 | 6,164 | 47,492 | 51,757 |

Units at risk of retirement: 50 percent of ACR

MW expected to retire 2023-2030

| | |
|--|--------|
| MW requested deactivation | 6,628 |
| MW expected to retire for regulatory reasons | 23,509 |

MW uneconomic 2023-2025 if ACR is reduced by 50 percent


| | |
|----------------------------|--------------|
| Coal | 7,490 |
| Natural Gas | 1,160 |
| Other | 843 |
| Total MW uneconomic | 9,493 |

| | |
|---------------------------------------|---------------|
| Total MW At Risk of Retirement | 39,629 |
|---------------------------------------|---------------|

Gas pipeline capacity for replacement capacity

| | 51,757 MW At Risk | | 39,629 MW At Risk | |
|--|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | 2021 | 2022 | 2021 | 2022 |
| Generation MWh | | | | |
| Coal | 96,434,916 | 88,385,951 | 84,969,554 | 76,448,164 |
| Natural Gas | 14,661,035 | 13,367,571 | 9,934,766 | 7,776,175 |
| Other | 1,159,165 | 1,480,549 | 1,109,324 | 1,362,766 |
| Total | 112,255,116 | 103,234,071 | 96,013,644 | 85,587,105 |
| New gas plants needed (MWh) | 97,594,081 | 89,866,500 | 86,078,878 | 77,810,930 |
| New CC unit ICAP (MW) | 1,182 | 1,182 | 1,182 | 1,182 |
| New CC unit capacity factor | 76% | 76% | 76% | 76% |
| New CC unit heat rate (mmbtu/MWh) | 6.369 | 6.369 | 6.369 | 6.369 |
| Annual MWh from 1 new unit | 7,878,188 | 7,878,188 | 7,878,188 | 7,878,188 |
| Number of new CC units needed | 13 | 12 | 11 | 10 |
| All units run at full ICAP for 1 day (MWh) | 368,784 | 340,416 | 312,048 | 283,680 |
| Total Dth needed (Dth/day) | 2,348,785 | 2,168,110 | 1,987,434 | 1,806,758 |
| Total Bcf needed (Bcf/day) | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 1.8 |

Map of unit retirements: 2011 through 2026



Recommendations: Planning

- **Modify the transmission project proposal templates to include data necessary to perform a detailed project lifetime financial analysis.**
- **All PJM transmission owners should use the same line rating method and implement dynamic line ratings (DLR), subject to NERC standards and guidelines, subject to review by NERC, PJM and the MMU, and approval by FERC.**
- **The market efficiency process should be eliminated. If retained, the cost/benefit calculation for economic projects needs to be corrected.**
- **MMU comments on transmission planning NOPR**

Recommendations: Energy Market Uplift

- **PJM should ensure that units not following dispatch are not paid uplift.**
- **CTs should not be defined to be always following dispatch.**
- **Flexible operating parameters should be required as a condition for receiving uplift.**
- **Uplift should not be paid to units backed down for reliability because there is no lost opportunity.**
- **Uplift should not be paid to units based on a fuel they are not burning.**
- **Uplift should not be paid to units on outage.**


Monthly energy uplift charges

| | 2021 Charges (Millions) | | | | | | 2022 Charges (Millions) | | | | | |
|--------------|-------------------------|----------------|-------------------|------------------------|----------------------|----------------|-------------------------|----------------|-------------------|------------------------|----------------------|----------------|
| | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Reactive Services | Synchronous Condensing | Black Start Services | Total | Day-Ahead | Balancing | Reactive Services | Synchronous Condensing | Black Start Services | Total |
| Jan | \$0.7 | \$6.8 | \$0.7 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$8.2 | \$0.7 | \$14.6 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$15.3 |
| Feb | \$0.9 | \$13.7 | \$0.1 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$14.6 | \$0.5 | \$5.1 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$0.1 | \$5.6 |
| Mar | \$2.8 | \$8.5 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$0.1 | \$11.4 | \$0.5 | \$7.0 | \$0.2 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$7.8 |
| Apr | \$0.8 | \$17.1 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$18.0 | \$0.6 | \$13.4 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$0.1 | \$14.1 |
| May | \$0.6 | \$8.7 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$9.4 | \$2.3 | \$12.1 | \$0.8 | \$0.0 | \$0.1 | \$15.3 |
| Jun | \$1.3 | \$16.5 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$17.8 | \$4.1 | \$20.1 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$24.2 |
| Jul | \$0.6 | \$19.7 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$20.3 | \$11.0 | \$25.7 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$36.7 |
| Aug | \$1.1 | \$21.2 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$22.3 | \$8.3 | \$32.1 | \$0.2 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$40.6 |
| Sep | \$1.9 | \$7.3 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$9.2 | \$7.2 | \$13.4 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$20.6 |
| Oct | \$0.4 | \$14.2 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$0.1 | \$14.7 | \$0.3 | \$12.8 | \$0.1 | \$0.0 | \$0.1 | \$13.3 |
| Nov | \$0.8 | \$21.6 | \$0.2 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$22.6 | \$1.2 | \$13.2 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$0.1 | \$14.5 |
| Dec | \$1.6 | \$8.2 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$9.9 | \$22.0 | \$59.5 | \$0.2 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$81.7 |
| Total | \$13.7 | \$163.5 | \$0.9 | \$0.0 | \$0.3 | \$178.4 | \$58.8 | \$229.1 | \$1.5 | \$0.0 | \$0.5 | \$289.9 |
| Share | 7.7% | 91.7% | 0.5% | 0.0% | 0.2% | 100.0% | 20.3% | 79.0% | 0.5% | 0.0% | 0.2% | 100.0% |


Total energy uplift credits by unit type

| Unit Type | 2021 Credits (Millions) | 2022 Credits (Millions) | Change | Percent Change | 2021 Share | 2022 Share |
|--------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|
| Combined Cycle | \$5.9 | \$33.7 | \$27.8 | 471.0% | 3.3% | 11.6% |
| Combustion Turbine | \$153.5 | \$174.5 | \$21.0 | 13.7% | 86.0% | 60.2% |
| Diesel | \$1.6 | \$3.1 | \$1.5 | 94.5% | 0.9% | 1.1% |
| Hydro | \$0.3 | \$1.1 | \$0.8 | 299.6% | 0.2% | 0.4% |
| Nuclear | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | (\$0.0) | (93.9%) | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Solar | \$0.0 | \$0.1 | \$0.1 | 860.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Steam - Coal | \$13.5 | \$35.2 | \$21.7 | 160.7% | 7.6% | 12.1% |
| Steam - Other | \$3.3 | \$39.8 | \$36.5 | 1,100.1% | 1.9% | 13.7% |
| Wind | \$0.3 | \$2.5 | \$2.1 | 623.3% | 0.2% | 0.8% |
| Total | \$178.4 | \$289.9 | \$111.5 | 62.5% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

PJM's footprint and its external scheduling interfaces



Scheduled import and export transaction volume history



The regulation market results were not competitive

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|---------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| Market Structure | Not Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Competitive | |
| Market Performance | Not Competitive | Flawed |

The synchronized reserve market results were competitive: October through December, 2022

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| Market Structure: Regional Markets | Not Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Competitive | |
| Market Performance | Competitive | Effective |


The 30 minute reserve market results were competitive: October through December, 2022

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|---------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| Market Structure | Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Competitive | |
| Market Performance | Competitive | Effective |

Adopted Recommendations: Reserve Markets

- **Removal of \$7.50 per MWh margin and variable operations and maintenance costs for synchronized reserve offers.**
- **Removal of tier 1 reserve payment triggered by a nonzero nonsynchronized reserve price.**
- **Enforcement of a synchronized reserve must offer requirement.**
- **Removal of DGP adjustment to reserve clearing.**
- **Termination of VACAR reserve sharing agreement**
- **Real-time obligation for day-ahead 30 minute reserves**
- **Opportunity cost basis for 30 minute reserve offers**

Primary reserve MW by source



Recommendations: Ancillary Services

- **The regulation market should be modified to incorporate a consistent application of the marginal benefit factor (MBF) throughout the optimization, assignment and settlement process.**
- **LOC should be based on actual unit ramp rates. Current LOC overstated significantly.**
- **Separate cost of service payments for reactive capability should be eliminated and the cost of reactive capability recovered in the capacity market.**
- **New CRF rates for black start units, incorporating current tax code changes, should be implemented immediately for all black start units.**

The FTR/ARR markets results were partially competitive

| Market Element | Evaluation | Market Design |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|
| Market Structure | Competitive | |
| Participant Behavior | Partially Competitive | |
| Market Performance | Partially Competitive | Flawed |

Recommendations: FTR/ARR

- **Rights to all congestion revenues should be assigned to load.**

Total congestion offset for load

| Revenue | | | | | | | | | | Pre 2017/2018 (Without Balancing) | | 2017/2018 (With Balancing) | | Post 2017/2018 (With Balancing and Surplus) | | Effective Offset | |
|--------------------|------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|---|-----------------------|------------------|--|
| Planning Period | ARR Credits | Unadjusted FTR Credits | Day Ahead Congestion | Balancing + M2M | | Surplus Revenue | | Post 2017/2018 Rules | Total | | Current | | New | | Cumulative Revenue | Offset | |
| | | | | Congestion | Total | Pre 2017/2018 Rules | Surplus Revenue 2017/2018 Rules | | ARR/FTR Offset | Percent Offset | Revenue Received | Percent Offset | Revenue Received | New Offset | | | |
| 2011/2012 | \$515.6 | \$310.0 | \$1,025.4 | (\$275.7) | \$749.7 | (\$50.6) | \$35.6 | \$113.9 | \$775.0 | 103.4% | \$585.5 | 78.1% | \$663.8 | 88.5% | \$775.0 | 103.4% | |
| 2012/2013 | \$356.4 | \$268.4 | \$904.7 | (\$379.9) | \$524.8 | (\$94.0) | \$18.4 | \$62.1 | \$530.7 | 101.1% | \$263.2 | 50.2% | \$306.9 | 58.5% | \$530.7 | 101.1% | |
| 2013/2014 | \$339.4 | \$626.6 | \$2,231.3 | (\$360.6) | \$1,870.6 | (\$139.4) | (\$49.0) | (\$49.0) | \$826.5 | 44.2% | \$556.3 | 29.7% | \$556.3 | 29.7% | \$826.5 | 44.2% | |
| 2014/2015 | \$487.4 | \$348.1 | \$1,625.9 | (\$268.3) | \$1,357.6 | \$36.7 | \$111.2 | \$400.6 | \$872.2 | 64.2% | \$678.4 | 50.0% | \$967.8 | 71.3% | \$872.2 | 64.2% | |
| 2015/2016 | \$641.8 | \$209.2 | \$1,098.7 | (\$147.6) | \$951.1 | \$9.2 | \$42.1 | \$188.9 | \$860.2 | 90.4% | \$745.5 | 78.4% | \$892.3 | 93.8% | \$860.2 | 90.4% | |
| 2016/2017 | \$648.1 | \$149.9 | \$885.7 | (\$104.8) | \$780.8 | \$15.1 | \$36.5 | \$179.0 | \$813.1 | 104.1% | \$729.6 | 93.4% | \$872.1 | 111.7% | \$813.1 | 104.1% | |
| 2017/2018 | \$429.6 | \$212.3 | \$1,322.1 | (\$129.5) | \$1,192.6 | \$52.3 | \$80.4 | \$370.7 | \$694.2 | 58.2% | \$592.8 | 49.7% | \$883.1 | 74.1% | \$592.8 | 49.7% | |
| 2018/2019 | \$531.6 | \$130.1 | \$832.7 | (\$152.6) | \$680.0 | (\$5.8) | \$16.2 | \$112.2 | \$655.87 | 96.4% | \$525.3 | 77.2% | \$621.3 | 91.4% | \$621.3 | 91.4% | |
| 2019/2020 | \$547.6 | \$91.9 | \$612.1 | (\$169.4) | \$442.7 | (\$1.6) | \$21.6 | \$157.8 | \$637.9 | 144.1% | \$491.7 | 111.1% | \$627.9 | 141.8% | \$627.9 | 141.8% | |
| 2020/2021 | \$392.7 | \$179.9 | \$899.6 | (\$256.2) | \$643.4 | (\$43.2) | (\$0.0) | (\$0.0) | \$529.31 | 82.3% | \$316.4 | 49.2% | \$316.4 | 49.2% | \$316.4 | 49.2% | |
| 2021/2022 | \$469.7 | \$500.3 | \$2,082.0 | (\$457.4) | \$1,624.6 | (\$101.7) | (\$0.0) | (\$0.0) | \$868.3 | 53.4% | \$512.5 | 31.5% | \$512.5 | 31.5% | \$512.5 | 31.5% | |
| 2022/2023* | \$576.2 | \$519.3 | \$1,771.5 | (\$355.1) | \$1,416.4 | (\$63.8) | \$38.8 | \$134.3 | \$1,031.7 | 72.8% | \$779.2 | 55.0% | \$874.7 | 61.8% | \$874.7 | 61.8% | |
| Total | \$5,935.9 | \$3,546.0 | \$15,291.5 | (\$3,057.2) | \$12,234.3 | (\$386.8) | \$351.7 | \$1,670.4 | \$9,095.1 | 74.3% | \$6,776.4 | 55.4% | \$8,095.2 | 66.2% | \$8,223.4 | 67.2% | |

Zonal ARR/FTR total congestion offset

| Zone | Adjusted ARR Credits | Adjusted FTR Credits | Balancing+ M2M Charge | Surplus Allocation | Surplus Total Offset | Day Ahead Congestion | Balancing Congestion | Balancing M2M Payments | Total Congestion | Total Offset |
|--------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|
| ACEC | \$2.0 | \$0.1 | (\$4.52) | \$0.38 | (\$2.0) | \$18.3 | (\$3.1) | (\$1.4) | \$13.8 | (14.7%) |
| AEP | \$48.1 | \$74.9 | (\$52.7) | \$18.5 | \$88.8 | \$279.4 | (\$35.9) | (\$16.8) | \$226.7 | 39.2% |
| APS | \$37.7 | \$21.3 | (\$20.9) | \$9.8 | \$47.8 | \$107.3 | (\$14.5) | (\$6.4) | \$86.4 | 55.3% |
| ATSI | \$22.7 | \$0.6 | (\$27.1) | \$3.9 | (\$0.0) | \$135.8 | (\$18.3) | (\$8.8) | \$108.7 | (0.0%) |
| BGE | \$85.8 | \$4.8 | (\$13.6) | \$15.0 | \$92.1 | \$71.0 | (\$9.4) | (\$4.2) | \$57.4 | 160.5% |
| COMED | \$25.0 | \$0.0 | (\$37.5) | \$4.2 | (\$8.3) | \$187.8 | (\$24.9) | (\$12.6) | \$150.3 | (5.5%) |
| DAY | \$5.3 | \$0.7 | (\$7.2) | \$1.0 | (\$0.2) | \$33.6 | (\$4.9) | (\$2.3) | \$26.4 | (0.7%) |
| DOM | \$24.3 | \$369.0 | (\$55.4) | \$4.8 | \$342.7 | \$284.3 | (\$40.0) | (\$15.4) | \$228.9 | 149.8% |
| DPL | \$49.3 | \$7.7 | (\$9.9) | \$1.1 | \$48.2 | \$65.2 | (\$7.4) | (\$2.5) | \$55.3 | 87.2% |
| DUKE | \$25.8 | \$5.5 | (\$11.3) | \$20.6 | \$40.6 | \$54.6 | (\$7.8) | (\$3.6) | \$43.3 | 93.9% |
| DUQ | \$6.5 | \$0.2 | (\$5.6) | \$9.5 | \$10.5 | \$20.9 | (\$3.8) | (\$1.8) | \$15.4 | 68.7% |
| EKPC | \$4.0 | \$0.1 | (\$5.5) | \$0.7 | (\$0.8) | \$28.4 | (\$3.7) | (\$1.8) | \$22.9 | (3.4%) |
| EXT | \$1.0 | \$0.0 | (\$8.1) | \$0.0 | (\$7.1) | \$34.3 | (\$8.1) | \$0.0 | \$26.2 | (27.3%) |
| JCPLC | \$4.5 | \$0.0 | (\$11.5) | \$0.8 | (\$6.3) | \$54.2 | (\$8.4) | (\$3.1) | \$42.7 | (14.9%) |
| MEC | \$27.3 | \$3.0 | (\$7.8) | \$4.9 | \$27.4 | \$34.2 | (\$5.7) | (\$2.1) | \$26.4 | 104.0% |
| OVEC | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | (\$0.4) | \$0.0 | (\$0.4) | \$3.0 | (\$0.4) | \$0.0 | \$2.7 | (13.6%) |
| PE | \$11.1 | \$6.1 | (\$7.3) | \$2.8 | \$12.8 | \$36.3 | (\$5.0) | (\$2.2) | \$29.0 | 44.1% |
| PECO | \$15.7 | \$8.3 | (\$16.7) | \$3.6 | \$10.9 | \$81.4 | (\$11.4) | (\$5.3) | \$64.7 | 16.9% |
| PEPCO | \$42.1 | \$3.7 | (\$12.5) | \$7.5 | \$40.9 | \$64.0 | (\$8.7) | (\$3.8) | \$51.5 | 79.5% |
| PPL | \$80.5 | \$11.1 | (\$19.4) | \$14.9 | \$87.0 | \$90.0 | (\$14.0) | (\$5.4) | \$70.6 | 123.3% |
| PSEG | \$56.9 | \$2.2 | (\$19.3) | \$10.3 | \$50.0 | \$83.6 | (\$13.3) | (\$6.0) | \$64.2 | 77.8% |
| REC | \$0.5 | \$0.0 | (\$0.7) | \$0.1 | (\$0.1) | \$3.8 | (\$0.5) | (\$0.2) | \$3.2 | (1.9%) |
| Total | \$576.2 | \$519.3 | (\$355.1) | \$134.3 | \$874.7 | \$1,771.5 | (\$249.2) | (\$105.9) | \$1,416.4 | 61.8% |

Offset available to load if all ARR's self scheduled


| | 20/21 Planning Period | | | | | 21/22 Planning Period | | | | | 22/23 Planning Period* | | | | |
|-------|-----------------------|-------------|-----------|------------|----------|-----------------------|-------------|-----------|------------|---------|------------------------|-------------|-----------|------------|---------|
| | Residual | | Bal+M2M | Congestion | | Residual | | Bal+M2M | Congestion | | Residual | | Bal+M2M | Congestion | |
| | SS FTR | ARR Credits | Charges | +M2M | Offset | SS FTR | ARR Credits | Charges | +M2M | Offset | SS FTR | ARR Credits | Charges | +M2M | Offset |
| ACEC | \$1.8 | \$0.3 | (\$2.7) | \$5.5 | (11.1%) | \$0.4 | \$0.1 | (\$5.2) | \$14.8 | (31.4%) | \$0.8 | \$0.0 | (\$4.5) | \$13.8 | (26.7%) |
| AEP | \$77.3 | \$1.2 | (\$38.1) | \$110.9 | 36.4% | \$132.5 | \$0.5 | (\$65.7) | \$240.4 | 28.0% | \$72.7 | \$0.4 | (\$52.7) | \$226.7 | 9.0% |
| APS | \$42.0 | \$0.2 | (\$14.8) | \$45.2 | 60.7% | \$93.3 | \$1.6 | (\$29.7) | \$122.8 | 53.1% | \$20.8 | \$1.9 | (\$20.9) | \$86.4 | 2.1% |
| ATSI | \$30.7 | \$0.0 | (\$19.5) | \$50.6 | 22.1% | \$47.3 | \$0.0 | (\$32.3) | \$117.9 | 12.7% | \$35.2 | \$0.2 | (\$27.1) | \$108.7 | 7.7% |
| BGE | \$79.7 | \$0.2 | (\$9.1) | \$24.8 | 285.0% | \$147.0 | \$0.1 | (\$17.0) | \$59.9 | 217.3% | \$97.6 | \$0.0 | (\$13.6) | \$57.4 | 146.4% |
| COMED | \$69.6 | \$0.0 | (\$28.5) | \$78.3 | 52.5% | \$51.9 | \$0.2 | (\$44.7) | \$159.9 | 4.6% | \$10.3 | \$0.5 | (\$37.5) | \$150.3 | (17.8%) |
| DAY | \$8.0 | \$0.0 | (\$5.3) | \$11.0 | 24.9% | \$7.1 | \$0.2 | (\$8.6) | \$26.2 | (4.7%) | \$3.2 | \$0.0 | (\$7.2) | \$26.4 | (15.2%) |
| DOM | \$117.0 | \$1.6 | (\$37.9) | \$87.9 | 91.8% | \$556.6 | \$11.5 | (\$22.0) | \$370.9 | 147.3% | \$321.1 | \$9.4 | (\$55.4) | \$228.9 | 120.2% |
| DPL | \$56.4 | \$5.7 | (\$6.7) | \$36.2 | 153.1% | \$52.3 | \$2.9 | (\$80.3) | (\$21.1) | 119.3% | \$40.3 | \$0.9 | (\$9.9) | \$55.3 | 56.7% |
| DUKE | \$40.9 | \$0.0 | (\$8.4) | \$17.4 | 187.5% | \$50.8 | \$0.7 | (\$12.3) | \$23.7 | 165.4% | \$29.7 | \$0.0 | (\$11.3) | \$43.3 | 42.4% |
| DUQ | \$8.9 | \$0.0 | (\$4.0) | \$6.2 | 79.7% | \$7.0 | \$0.0 | (\$6.4) | \$45.3 | 1.2% | \$6.4 | \$0.0 | (\$5.6) | \$15.4 | 5.6% |
| EKPC | \$6.6 | \$0.0 | (\$4.2) | \$8.4 | 29.3% | \$10.1 | \$0.0 | (\$7.0) | \$21.9 | 14.2% | \$6.0 | \$0.0 | (\$5.5) | \$22.9 | 2.3% |
| EXT | \$0.3 | \$0.0 | (\$13.8) | \$11.0 | (122.3%) | \$1.9 | \$0.0 | (\$9.9) | \$19.9 | (40.0%) | NA | \$0.0 | (\$8.1) | \$26.2 | (30.9%) |
| JCPLC | \$0.9 | \$0.0 | (\$6.1) | \$12.9 | (40.1%) | \$4.4 | \$0.0 | (\$12.8) | \$39.0 | (21.7%) | \$2.4 | \$0.0 | (\$11.5) | \$42.7 | (21.3%) |
| MEC | \$8.0 | \$0.0 | (\$5.3) | \$16.5 | 16.6% | \$31.3 | \$0.0 | (\$11.6) | \$33.2 | 59.5% | \$35.2 | \$0.0 | (\$7.8) | \$26.4 | 103.7% |
| OVEC | NA | \$0.0 | (\$0.3) | \$0.9 | (28.8%) | NA | \$0.0 | (\$0.4) | \$1.5 | (29.4%) | NA | \$0.0 | (\$0.4) | \$2.7 | (13.6%) |
| PE | \$13.5 | \$0.0 | (\$6.5) | \$16.4 | 42.8% | \$29.7 | \$0.1 | (\$18.5) | \$31.8 | 35.5% | \$8.5 | \$0.2 | (\$7.3) | \$29.0 | 4.7% |
| PECO | \$14.0 | \$0.3 | (\$10.9) | \$24.9 | 13.4% | \$6.2 | \$0.8 | (\$12.0) | \$78.0 | (6.5%) | \$12.2 | \$0.0 | (\$16.7) | \$64.7 | (7.0%) |
| PEPCO | \$37.3 | \$0.0 | (\$8.3) | \$20.5 | 141.9% | \$59.2 | \$0.0 | (\$15.5) | \$53.8 | 81.2% | \$44.4 | \$0.0 | (\$12.5) | \$51.5 | 61.9% |
| PPL | \$43.7 | \$1.3 | (\$11.5) | \$30.8 | 108.7% | \$160.3 | \$0.0 | (\$21.5) | \$103.3 | 134.4% | \$80.5 | \$0.0 | (\$19.4) | \$70.6 | 86.4% |
| PSEG | \$43.2 | \$0.4 | (\$13.9) | \$25.0 | 118.4% | \$94.0 | \$0.2 | (\$23.1) | \$76.0 | 93.4% | \$18.8 | \$0.4 | (\$19.3) | \$64.2 | (0.3%) |
| REC | \$1.0 | \$0.0 | (\$0.6) | \$2.1 | 21.0% | \$1.1 | \$0.0 | (\$0.8) | \$5.3 | 6.2% | \$0.2 | \$0.0 | (\$0.7) | \$3.2 | (14.0%) |
| Total | \$700.9 | \$11.2 | (\$256.2) | \$643.4 | 70.9% | \$1,544.3 | \$18.8 | (\$457.4) | \$1,624.6 | 68.1% | \$846.4 | \$13.9 | (\$355.1) | \$1,416.4 | 35.7% |

FTR profits and revenues by organization type and FTR direction: 2022/2023: June through December


| Organization Type | Purchased FTRs Profit | | | Self Scheduled FTRs Revenue Returned | | |
|-------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|---------------|--------------------------------------|--------------|---------------|
| | Prevailing Flow | Counter Flow | Total | Prevailing Flow | Counter Flow | Total |
| Financial | \$473,690,828 | (\$60,497,082) | \$413,193,747 | | | |
| Physical | \$111,162,560 | (\$16,030,547) | \$95,132,013 | | | |
| Physical ARR | \$86,443,439 | (\$54,103,879) | \$32,339,560 | \$518,589,688 | \$8,216,410 | \$526,806,098 |
| Total | \$671,296,827 | (\$130,631,507) | \$540,665,320 | \$518,589,688 | \$8,216,410 | \$526,806,098 |

Winter Storm Elliott


Load, Area Control Error, and LMP: December 23 and 24, 2022




December 23, 2022 outages




December 24, 2022 outages




December 23, 1600 EPT through December 24, 2200 EPT unit performance




Components of real-time dispatch run load-weighted average LMP: December 23




Components of real-time pricing run load-weighted average LMP: December 23



Components of real-time dispatch run load-weighted average LMP: December 24



Components of real-time pricing run load-weighted average LMP: December 24



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