

# FCP Joint Stakeholder Proposal

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- ▶ Primarily the status quo or the same as the IMM package
- ▶ Eliminates annual review
  - ▶ Allow for PJM or the IMM to seek new FCP due to change in circumstances
- ▶ A change in Market Seller requires a need to reaffirm a FCP
  - ▶ Other changes, such as agents, don't need any FCP adjustment
- ▶ Self-identified errors reduce penalty to 25% of the calculation
- ▶ Safe-harbor for unusual situations not contemplated by FCP
- ▶ Temporary FCPs based on heat rate and gas pricing point

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- ▶ Penalty based on IMM's proposal, full penalty (impact factor of 1) if:
  - ▶ Unit clears DA or runs RT on cost-based offers AND is either
    - ▶ Paid DA/Balancing operating reserves or
    - ▶ Cost offer is above \$1,000/MWh
  - ▶ Or, unit fails TPS test for constraints
  - ▶ Or, cost offer is above \$1,000/MWh
- ▶ 10% of full penalty if the above don't apply - to reflect lack of impact
- ▶ Penalty applies during any hour in which offer was incorrect

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- ▶ Penalty calculation is performed hourly for each hour of the invalid offer.
- ▶ Penalty capped at the Calculated Net Energy Margin for any impacted hour.
  - ▶ Calculated Net Energy Margin shall mean the summation of any impacted hours resulting from the following formula:
  - ▶  $\Sigma \text{ Unit Calculated Net Energy Margin} = \text{LMPh} \times \text{MWh} - \text{Accurate CBOh}$
  - ▶ Where an Accurate CBOh means the total resource production cost derived from an accurate Cost-Based offer (consistent with the numeric example provided with the Market Seller's Fuel Cost Policy) which shall be calculated on an hourly basis.