

Fuel Security Update

Operating Committee July 15, 2021



June OC:

- Background and review of previous fuel security efforts
- Fuel Security Resource Adequacy Assessment Methodology & RTO Level Results for Fuel Security Monitoring
- 3. Fuel Security Phase III update

July OC:

- 1. Additional detailed results for Fuel Security Monitoring
- 2. Address questions & feedback from June OC




Feedback from June Operating Committee

- Extreme loads considered in analysis
 - Additional context provided for cold snap loads analyzed as percentage of 2026/27 winter and summer 90/10 peak loads.
 - Impacts of maintenance outages in shoulder periods being considered for future analysis.
- Evaluation of additional resource portfolios
 - Following slides include a sensitivity of the 2026/27 RTEP portfolio accounting for recently announced retirements.
 - Additional portfolios are being considered for future analysis.
- Terminology clarification
 - This assessment is intended to cover fuel-related and common mode risks to all resource types, and is consistent with the terminology defined in the <u>FSSTF charter</u>.



Cold Snap & Load Scenarios






2026/27 RTEP Portfolio Adjusted for Recent Deactivation Requests

4,561 UCAP MW removed from 2026/27 RTEP Portfolio to reflect recent Deactivation Requests (as of 6/28/2021)

Nuclear removed: 2,305 MW; Coal removed: 2,206 MW




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Average Additional* LOLE, Conditional on Disruption Size, RTO

- Accounting for recent deactivation requests, non-zero LOLE observed beginning with disruptions of 2,000 MW beyond FS-FOR and other random forced outages.
- Shift in generic disruption size with non-zero LOLE from 2026/27 portfolio mirrors UCAP of recent deactivation requests (4,561 MW)


Conditional LOLE (Days/Winter)





Average Additional* LOLE, Conditional on Disruption Size, PJM West


 Accounting for recent deactivation requests in PJM West, non-zero LOLE observed beginning with disruptions of 4,900 MW beyond FS-FOR and other random forced outages.





Average Additional* LOLE, Conditional on Disruption Size, MAAC


• Accounting for recent deactivation requests in MAAC, non-zero LOLE observed beginning with disruptions of 5,500 MW beyond FS-FOR and other random forced outages.





Average Additional* LOLE, Conditional on Disruption Size, EMAAC


 Non-zero LOLE observed beginning with disruptions of 9,2000 MW beyond FS-FOR and other random forced outages. Recent deactivation requests accounted for in analysis are not in EMAAC.





Average Additional* LOLE, Conditional on Disruption Size, SWMAAC

Additional LOLE observed in SWMAAC considering FS-FOR and other random forced outages with no additional disruptions.





- Update Markets & Reliability Committee
- Review additional stakeholder feedback on Fuel Security Monitoring Methodology
- When appropriate, consider this assessment as part of related efforts (e.g. Capacity Market Workshops)



Fuel Security Monitoring Methodology & RTO Level Results

Presented at June OC (6/10/2021)



Recent Operational Assessments & Related Initiatives

Category Related Assessments/Initiatives Winter Operations Review (May 14, 2021 OC) Seasonal Trends & system performance **Operations** Review Winter Lessons Learned (May 14, 2021 OC) Focus Areas: **Event** Review previous PJM and industry lessons learned **Analysis** Review load shed procedures Generator performance and preparedness Gas pipeline, production and supply coordination

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Winter Operations Assessment Follow-Up (June 7, 2021 OC)



Fuel Security Resource Adequacy Assessment

 Probabilistic "stress test" of most recent five-year ahead Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (RTEP) portfolio using historical cold snap events

- General Considerations:
 - Going forward, assessment will be conducted during the first quarter of each year as the RTEP portfolio is developed in February of each year.
 - 2021 assessment uses 2026/2027 RTEP portfolio.
 - Inputs to the assessment will be updated by December of each year.
 The updates will involve rolling in data on each of the inputs from the previous winter season.



Methodology Overview Additional Details Posted With OC Materials

Inputs

- Winter hourly load shapes derived from historical cold snaps
- Forced outage rates (fuel security-related and random)
- Wind/solar capacity factors
- Generic disruptions of variable impact

Procedure


- Set impact of generic disruption at X MW
- Calculate conditional LOLE based on each historical cold snap
- Aggregate LOLE values by delivery year
- Calculate average conditional LOLE

Output

Portfolio's LOLE conditional on the occurrence on a generic disruption of size X MW coincident with a cold snap



Cold Snap & Load Scenarios





Avg.

Generator Availability in Cold Snap Scenarios

Thermal & Hydro Forced Outages During Hour With Lowest Margin

Aggregate Random Fuel Security Forced Outage Rate (FS-FOR) Unavailability as Share of ICAP **Forced Outage Rate** (R-FOR), EXCLUDING **Natural Gas** Nuclear Oil Coal Hydro **FS-Related Outages** 14.3% 0.0% 1.9% 0.6% 0.6% 8.3%

 Min.
 7.3%
 0.0%
 0.0%
 0.1%
 7.9%

 Max.
 17.5%
 0.0%
 4.0%
 2.6%
 0.8%
 9.5%

Solar & Wind Availability

During Hour With Lowest

Margin, as Share of

Nameplate

	Solar	Wind
Avg.	1.0%	39.9%
Min.	0.0%	16.3%
Max.	9.3%	63.2%



Example Common-Mode Megawatt Losses as Context for Generic Disruptions


Disruption Type	Worst Case Potential Loss (MW)	Assumptions
Natural Gas Pipeline Contingency with Electric System Impact	4,945	Worst case; units with dual fuel or alternate pipeline are not able to switch.
Regulatory Event Impacting Nuclear Generation	32,300	All nuclear units in the PJM footprint are required to come offline concurrently.
Regional Event Impacting Nuclear Generation	10,000—16,000	A localized event, such as severe weather pattern, requires nuclear generation in a localized region to come offline concurrently.
Coal Barge Disruption	12,800	River freezing, or similar, leads to fuel delivery issues impacting all coal units that rely exclusively on barge fuel deliveries. Assumes coal piles are already running low.
Coal Rail Disruption	9,600	Rail failure, or similar, leads to fuel delivery issues impacting all coal units that rely exclusively on rail fuel deliveries. Assumes coal piles are already running low.
Coal Truck Disruption	3,200	Trucking availability, or similar, leads to fuel delivery issues impacting all coal units that rely exclusively on truck fuel deliveries. Assumes coal piles are already running low.
Non-Coal Barge Disruption	2,800	River freezing, or similar, leads to fuel delivery issues impacting all non-coal units that rely exclusively on barge fuel deliveries.
Non-Coal Truck Disruption	3,800	Trucking availability, or similar, leads to fuel delivery issues impacting all non-coal units that rely exclusively on truck fuel deliveries.
Wind Turbine Shutdown Due to Operating Limits	3,800	Extreme low temperatures, or similar, requires wind turbines in a localized region being forced to come offline concurrently.



Average Additional* LOLE, Conditional on Disruption Size, **RTO**

2021 FS-RA Assessment of 2026/2027 RTEP Portfolio

Conditional LOLE (Days/Winter)



Generic Disruption (MW)

^{*} LOLE values are in addition to portfolio LOLE outside of the winter period.




Average Additional* LOLE, Conditional on Disruption Size Comparison to FSSTF Results, RTO

Comparison With Caveats:

While the overall portfolio changes put downward pressure on LOLE, the upward pressure on LOLE exerted by the more extreme simulated winter loads dominates, resulting in slightly more LOLE in the 2021 analysis compared to the FSSTF analysis.


Conditional LOLE (Days/Winter)





Portfolio Changes Put Downward Pressure on LOLE


Increase in generation with high simulated unavailability during cold snaps, but higher overall UCAP reserve levels (22% vs 28%) in 2026/2027 RTEP portfolio compared to FSSTF portfolio.



Percent Change Resource Type UCAF		
• Hydro	-2%	
 Pumped Storage 	1%	
• Wind	-7%	Lowest
• Solar	311%	simulated winter
 Nuclear 	8%	availability
rtadicai	070	
• Coal	-4%	Highest
		Highest simulated fuel-related
• Coal	-4%	simulated
CoalNatural Gas	-4% 10%	simulated fuel-related
CoalNatural GasPetroleum	-4% 10% -36%	simulated fuel-related



Simulation of More Extreme Loads Puts Upward Pressure on the LOLE





Background & Review of Previous Fuel Security Efforts

Presented at June OC (6/10/2021)



Fuel Security as Part of PJM Resilience Initiatives

Infrastructure


- 1 Enhanced Models & Analysis
- 2 RTEP Criteria
- 3 Cranking Path Redundancy

Supply

1 Attributes for Wholesale Supply



3 Black Start Requirements



Operations Criteria

- 1 Load Loss Limits
- 2 Locational Limits
- 3 Interdependent Systems



Background: Fuel Security at PJM

PJM produces a series of reports on impacts of the changing landscape of the power industry, including a report evaluating the changing resource mix in PJM and reliability attributes. **Feb./March:** Problem Statement & Issue Charge presented to and approved by PJM stakeholders, identifying fuel security as an important component of reliability and resilience.

Feb.: Operating Committee Work Plan updated to include periodic fuel security updates.

2015-2017

2018

2019

2020

April: PJM releases a brief outlining its intent to perform further analysis on the topic of fuel security and its proposed approach to the process.

Nov./Dec.: PJM releases the results of its analysis and simulations and presents the data to its stakeholders, identifying some potential risks and vulnerabilities associated with fuel security.

April – Dec.: Fuel
Security Senior Task
Force conducts additional
analysis to evaluate
options and provide
recommendations to the
larger PJM stakeholder
body.

Dec.: MRC votes to sunset the FSSTF and continue to monitor parameters considered in the fuel security analysis and report to the MRC.

July/Sept.:
Periodic
updates
provided to
the Operating
Committee.



Background: Three Phases of PJM Fuel Security

Phase I

Stress the system to identify potential system vulnerabilities related to fuel delivery infrastructure risks.

Phase II


Work through the PJM stakeholder process to identify if market, operational or planning changes are needed to address fuel security.

Phase III

Work with federal and state agencies alongside other industry sectors to address any specific security concerns, such as physical and cybersecurity risks.



Phase I: 2018 Fuel Security Analysis Scenarios



pjm.com > Library > Reports & Notices > Fuel Security > 2018 Fuel Security Analysis



Phase I: 2018 Fuel Security Analysis Conclusions



There is NO immediate threat to the reliability of the PJM RTO.

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Reports & Notices >
Fuel Security > 2018
Fuel Security Analysis



- PJM is reliable in the announced retirements and escalated retirements cases under all typical winter load scenarios.
- PJM is reliable in the announced retirements cases under all extreme winter load scenarios.



- Scenarios to identify points at which an assumption or combination of assumptions begin to impact the ability to reliably serve customers.
- The stressed scenarios resulted in a loss of load under extreme but plausible conditions.

Contributing factors:

- The level of retirements and replacements
- The level of non-firm gas availability
- The ability to replenish oil supplies
- The location, magnitude and duration of pipeline disruption
- Pipeline configuration



Phase II: 2019 Fuel Security Senior Task Force Work Streams

Risk Assessment

- Review scope of relevant risks
- Review Phase 1
 analysis to identify opportunities
 for supplemental modeling
- Scenario development

Scenario Analysis

- Additional deterministic analysis utilizing Phase 1 approach
- Probabilistic analysis utilizing data on historical events to calculate conditional Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE)

Gap Analysis


Assessment of existing market, operational and planning mechanisms to determine gaps in uncertainties/risks, procurement period, compensation and incentives



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Task Force



Phase II: 2019 FSSTF Summary



4,720,380 Scenarios

Phase I (324)

Phase II 4,720,056

- Gap analysis demonstrated there may be gaps in existing mechanisms in compensation and incentives
- Loss of load scenarios exist for extreme but plausible events
- No immediate threat

Cost Impacts

Dependent on expectations of scenarios and perceived value of loss load

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FSSTF Sunset After December 2019 MRC

Path 1: Status Quo

PJM continues to monitor and revisit with stakeholders if risk increases.

- Included in a stakeholder work plan
- Guidelines provided to stakeholders with opportunity to provide feedback

Path 2: Pre-Defined Criteria

PJM and stakeholders develop criteria but do not develop solution until criteria is met.

• Criteria to be developed in 2020

Path 3: Solution Developed

Stakeholders develop a solution mechanism to automatically be triggered based on an embedded criteria.

 Criteria and solution mechanism to be developed in 2020



*All paths include incorporation of potential NERC guidelines/standards or FERC orders if applicable.



Scope of Periodic Updates for Fuel Security

1. Fuel Security Monitoring

- Operational metrics, seasonal reporting and event analysis
- Fuel Security Resource Adequacy Assessment: LOLE sensitivity analysis of five-year ahead RTEP portfolio during extreme winter weather events

2. Updates on Fuel Security Phase III

Work with federal agencies and other industry sectors to analyze physical and cybersecurity risks

3. PJM Gas-Electric Coordination Team Efforts

Seasonal reporting and event analysis

4. Fuel Security-Related Industry Updates

NERC Electric-Gas Working Group (EGWG)



Fuel Security Phase III Update

Presented at June OC (6/10/2021)



Fuel Security Phase III

Initiated collaboration

with a major interstate gas pipeline on identification of physical and cyber threat scenarios to study PJM and pipeline personnel met with FERC, TSA, PHMSA to review threat scenario studies

Reviewed results

of the scenarios and impacts with federal agencies

Q4 2019

Q1 2020

Q2 2020

Q3 2020

Q4 2020

Beyond

 Initial results, simulated on 2023 portfolio, indicated impacts to the BES were limited as system conditions
 never went beyond the implementation of demand response

PJM and pipeline engaged in analysis of worst case physical and cyber attack scenarios involving complete loss of multiple compressor stations and loss of a portion of a key mainline pipe segment

 Will continue to evaluate opportunities for future analysis

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Fuel Security Update



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